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Introduction
Markets play a central role in the social care system, a role that was entrenched by the
1990 NHS and Community Care Act. The position of local authorities as a major
purchaser of independent residential care and sponsor for clients gives them both the
scope and obligation to manage and shape these social care markets. In this process
authorities have been working to some extent in the dark.  What type of contracts
seem to generate the desired results?  What effect are their actions having on local
markets and how does this translate through to the type of care people receive and the
cost of  that care?  A survey of admissions of elderly people to residential and
nursing home care provides an opportunity to address some of these issues from the
perspective of publicly funded placements.
This paper briefly describes the survey before discussing the methodology and results
of an analysis of the costs of placing people in residential and nursing homes. The
main aim of the paper is to explore the factors which might explain the variation of
the price of placements identified by the survey.
The survey
Between mid October 1995 and January 1996 information was collected about the
circumstances of 2,500 permanent publicly funded admissions from 18 local
authorities to residential and nursing home care.  Social workers or care managers
provided information about the household, dependency characteristics, circumstances
of admission, type of home to which they were admitted and contractual
arrangements.  Data were also collected from the authorities about the financial
circumstances and contributions to fees for over 2,100 cases. All the elderly people
were tracked one month after admission to identify mortality and location of
survivors.
The survey was designed to feed into discussions about the Standard Spending
Assessment formulae (1).  For this purpose it was important that as much information
as possible was comparable with nationally available data.  Information about
household circumstances was collected to enable comparison with census data and
3information about dependency characteristics to allow comparisons with people over
65 living in private households identified in the General Household Survey (GHS).
In addition, information was collected to enable the estimation of a number of
dependency measures including Barthel (2) and the DHSS 4-category measure used
in previous surveys of residential care (3).  In order to reflect cognitive difficulties
the items used to compile the Minimum Data Set Cognitive Performance Scale
(MDSCPS) were included.  This seven category hierarchy provides a functional view
of cognitive performance that has been shown to correspond closely to the Mini-
Mental State Examination and the Test for Severe Impairment (4).
The survey forms one part of a three part study of residential and nursing home care.
The other two elements of the survey are a longitudinal follow-up of admissions and
a cross-sectional survey of homes.  The longitudinal follow-up is tracking residents
six, 18, 30, and 42 months after admission.  The cross-sectional survey has collected
data about residents in over 600 homes in 21 authorities, 17 of which were included
in the survey of admissions.
The objective in the admissions survey was to select a representative sample of local
authorities on the basis of authority type, size, population density and socio-economic
status.  As a result of some authorities being unable to participate a
disproportionately large number of metropolitan districts were included in the survey
(eight metropolitan districts, five counties, and five London boroughs).
Theoretical background
In order to explore variation in the prices of admission to residential and nursing
home care we need to identify the principal expected reasons for such variation in
prices.  The expected influences on the price of placement were drawn from a
theoretical spatial competition model. We use a standard product differentiation
model with a continuous (circular) product space where products are differentiated in
a single spatial dimension (5) (6) (7) (8). The demand expressed for provider i’s
product will depend on its price, the price of competitors and the distance between
competitors in terms of the location of their products. Suppose that in addition to
provider i, there are two representative providers, one on the ‘left’ and one on the
4‘right’ of provider i along the dimension representing product location, denoted i - 1
and i + 1 respectively. At this stage we are not restraining the market in terms of the
number of providers, but rather assuming that the effect of all providers other than i
is summarised by the effects of two representatives. Let the degree of differentiation
or the distance between provider i and representatives i - 1 and i + 1 be fi-1 and fi+1.
The distance between the two representatives providers is: f0.
Total demand for provider i’s product (Di) is determined by the number of consumers
who buy product i rather than i+1, which is denoted xi and the number who buy
product i rather than i-1. The latter figure is determined by the number of buying
consumers whose ideal product is located between provider i and i-1’s product,
which is determined by distance between these products, fi-1, less the number who
buy product i-1. In the usual way demand is therefore:
(1) ( )D x f x D p p p f f q q qi i i i i i i i i i i i i= + − =− − + − + − + −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, , , , , , ,
where for each product j = i, i+1, i-1, price is pj, fj is distance and qj is a vector of
demand-shift factors that affect the relationship between price and demand levels. In
particular the latter factor might be the product ‘type’ as distinct from its spatial
location, an example of which might be its quality. Thus consumers may pay
different prices for a product located at the same place as a result of these products
being of a somewhat different type. The empirical specification of this vector is
discussed below. The distance between provider j and i i.e. f{L, n} is a function of the
total size of the market (L) and the number of providers in the market (n). We assume
that distance between providers is negatively related to the total number of providers
in the market, given a constant total market size (δf/δn < 0). Also, that distance is
positively related to total market size given a fixed number of providers (δf/δL > 0).
Demand functions for the other two products are analogous to Eq. (1).
Placement costs are assumed to take the following form:
(2) ( )C c x F q ii i i i= + ∀
5Where ci is unit marginal cost and F is a sunk fixed cost whose size is affected by the
product’s type.  Profits for provider i are then as follows:
(3) ( )( )π i i i i i ip c x f x F= − + − −− −1 1
with analogous functions for the other two providers. The profit function is assumed
to be additively separate in prices and demand-shift factors (q). We also assume that
providers first choose the product type (given its location), then set prices. Prices are
therefore determined with given product type. Solving for the first order condition,
holding marginal costs constant between providers, the reduced-form price function
take the form:
(4) ( )p p f f f q q q ci i i i i i i* , , , , , ,= − + − +1 1 0 1 1
Estimating this function empirically, whilst not problematic in theory, does present
some data problems. In practice, we do not have data for demand-shift factors i.e.
product type (q) and market distance (f) for the representative providers i+1 and i-1,
which are theoretical constructs. However, two further theoretical manipulations can
provide an estimable function.
First, we can remove the dependence on qi+1 and qi-1. In anticipating at the first stage
prices that will be optimal at the second the first stage - as given by Eq. (4) - optimal
product type functions ( )qi+ ⋅1*  and ( )qi− ⋅1*  can be solved and then substituted into the
price function. In this way, we are left with optimal prices which are the basis for our
empirical modelling, parameterised in the normal way (with the vector β) and with
error ε:
(5) ( )p p f f f q ci i i i i= +− +1 1 0, , , , ;β ε
6Second, we can assume that, on entry, each provider locates at an equal distance from
each other and also that consumers are uniformly distributed according to their tastes
so that fi = fi+1 = fi-1. Therefore, Eq. (5) reduces to:
(6) ( )p p c q fi i i= +, , ;β ε
Product differentiation allows providers to set prices away from competitors’ prices
and higher than marginal cost and still maintain a viable level of sales. The basis for
this argument is that consumers are prepared to pay more for a product or service
which closely matches their ideal product. In the model the degree of differentiation
or distance, f, between one product and its closest substitutes has a bearing on price.
Market distance (f)
In practice this product differentiation may be in terms of the geographical location
of homes. Distance between competitors then depends on the size of the market -
total distance or area in geographical terms - and the amount of provision. The level
of provision is hypothesised to be explained by the level of contestability of the
market; that is, the ease or costliness of market entry which is determined by the size
of barriers to market entry and exit (9). Other things being equal we might expect
market entry to continue until prices are driven down so that revenue is in line with
costs. Market entry costs then limit the number of providers in a market and so
maintain geographical separation or distance and, as a consequence, generate a
surplus for the provider once entry costs are absorbed. For our analysis, it means that
the magnitude of differentiation should be a direct influence on price. Otherwise, if
markets were contestable prices would equal marginal costs implying that the size of
the market and number of providers would have no influence on price.
The number of providers that can be accommodated in a contestable market will also
be affected by the level of aggregate demand. In our empirical analysis, a number of
discrete market areas exist as defined by each of the eight local authorities in the
sample. Locality’s purchasing power, and the nature of the LA regulation and
admissions process need to be accounted for to control for differences between
sample local authorities. Purchasing power refers to both the financial wherewithal of
7the local authority and also the political preferences for provision of residential care
services to meet perceived needs.
The independent residential care market is also affected by the extent and nature of
public sector local authority (LA) provision. Wistow et al. (10) suggest that the
relationship between local authority purchasers and these local authority providers is
on a somewhat different basis than the relationship between LA purchasers and the
independent sector. This hypothesis implies that competition between individual
independent sector providers and LA providers is different from competition within
the independent sector. In particular we suppose initially the possibility that some
quantity-adjustment process is in operation which can supersede the price
mechanism. At the extreme then, the total amount of the LA sector provision affects
the independent sector by changing the level of demand for the latter sector’s supply
rather than competing for a given level of demand. We therefore call this the residual
demand model. In so far as this is the case, the impact of the public sector is in terms
of a demand-shift effect and not in terms of supply-side product differentiation.
Costs (c)
Placement costs, C, are influenced by input prices, the characteristics of the
individual (including their level of dependency, their circumstances at admission and
so on) and characteristics of the home. The latter encompasses the ‘technology of
care’, that is the process by which the use of resource inputs such as skilled labour
and specialised capital leads to changes in welfare outcomes for users. For a given
level and quality (and so value) of outcomes, the level of expenditure on inputs (i.e.
costs) can vary according to the care technology used (11). Features of homes and the
nature of the ‘product’, which characterise the technology of care, should then be an
influence on costs and in turn, prices.
Demand shift (q)
These home and product characteristics or types are also expected to have an effect
on demand. They constitute our first form of demand-shift effect as captured by the
term q in the above model. The second relevant demand-shift effect, considered
below, is contract arrangements. Both influence the relationship between price and
8demand for each product. Respectively, we write these influences as q = {Q, Y} and
so our empirical model becomes:
(7) ( )p p c Q Y fi i i i= +, , , ;β ε
The former demand-shift effect, Q, refers in particular to the distinction between
nursing and residential care and also to the private and voluntary sector ownership
difference. Various aspects of care quality are also relevant dimensions by which
providers may seek to differentiate their products.
There are two dimensions of contracting (element Y) which are believed to have a
particular influence on prices. First, in expressing demands for services, whether
reimbursement is linked to the provision of facilities as in block contracts, or linked
to clients as in spot contracts. Second, whether reimbursement is agreed in advance
(at the start of a contract period and so prior to any admissions made under that
contract) or whether payment is determined at the point of admission (and so can
potentially be made contingent on the client’s circumstances and characteristics).
Contracting choices have ramifications for the distribution of risk between purchaser
and provider and therefore affect the size of the real costs organisations incur in
providing a service. For example, with fixed price spot contracts (often called call-off
contracts), providers’ unit revenue is fixed but unit cost depends on both the
dependency characteristics of the client and also the number of client referrals
(relative to the optimal home capacity). The provider is exposed to all the risk with
this type of contract. Block contracts in contrast, do not make reimbursement
contingent on the number of referrals; the risk is instead shifted to the purchaser.
Choices between different contracting arrangements also imply choices of different
sets of incentives, which will affect demand for placements. Information problems
are of particular relevance. When information regarding production is asymmetrically
distributed between purchaser and provider (in favour of the provider) the potential is
created for providers to use their better information in three ways to increase surplus
(profit). First, by misrepresenting client or product characteristics; for example,
claiming that the costs of care of a client of particular dependency are higher than is
9actually the case and thereby securing a higher payment or exaggerating product
quality to improve demand. Second, by shirking on efforts to reduce costs or by
cutting corners on meeting specifications. Third, by using superior information to
select or cream-skim those clients who are likely to be low cost. The choice of
contracts has a direct effect on such behaviours: fixed price contracts promote the
third type, whilst contracts with client-specific prices promote the first. Both types of
contract are susceptible to the second problem.
Empirical specification
Regression analysis was used to estimate a price function as specified as equation (7).
The unit of analysis is the individual placement. The analysis excluded placements in
local authority homes and used a sample of 2171 placements in independent sector
homes for which information was available about gross fees charged and contracting
arrangements. Missing values reduced the final estimation sample to 1880
placements. The ‘price’ dependent variable is the gross cost of the placement
including contributions by the local authority, the client and any top-up payments
made by others. In relevant authorities this was deflated using the Area Cost
Adjustment (ACA) which essentially allows for higher labour input costs expected in
London and the South East.  The average cost of all placements before deflating
using the ACA is £285.  Once area variations have been allowed for the average cost
is £272.  As this adjusted figure has been used in the main analysis these deflated
figures have been reported below unless specified otherwise.
Table 1 presents the range of independent variables that are used to act as empirical
proxies for the four theoretical components (c, Q, Y and f) in equation (7). The exact
definition of the independent variables is given below. As the underlying theoretical
specification is the reduced form price equation the ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression technique is sufficient and appropriate in the estimation of the




A shortcoming of the estimation arises with respect to data limitations. In particular,
appropriate proxy variables to capture the influence of demand-shift effects on price
were difficult to find. Dummy variables identifying each of the local authority areas
were used. However, on the usual grounds of statistical performance, theoretical
appropriateness and parsimony these variables were dropped. As reported below,
diagnostic tests could not reject the final model as being mis-specified.
Data limitations were also binding with respect to quality variables. The usual
problem of finding reliable indicators of quality, particularly the intangible aspects
was found to apply. Finally, the slight over-representation of metropolitan local
authorities raised some questions about sample representativeness. In view of the
very large number of observations spread across all sample local authorities, it is
anticipated that all expected sources of variation are adequately represented in the
data. Thus there should be no obvious distortions in the findings. Nonetheless, if
conclusions were to be drawn out regarding the national picture, some re-weighting
might be advisable.
Results
The results of the OLS estimation are given in tables 2. Statistical diagnosis provided
no grounds for the rejection of the specification (Ramsey’s Reset test was not
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level). A test for heteroskedasticity rejected
the starting assumption that the variance of the OLS error terms is constant. Non-
constant error variance does not put any bias on the estimated (beta) coefficients of
the independent variables. It does, however, render uncorrected t-ratios unsafe (t-
ratios indicate the probability that the estimated coefficient falls within corresponding
limits around the real value). However, White (13) provides a correction for this
problem; hence White’s t-ratios are given in tables 2.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The estimation produced a high adjusted R-squared statistic which provides some
indication of the degree to which difference in prices between providers in our
sample are explained by the independent variables.
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The specification was also applied to the nursing and residential care sub-samples
separately. The estimation results were very similar for both new models compared
with each other and with the combined sample model. The only significant difference
was that the sign on the spot contracts variable was positive for the nursing homes
sub-sample (see below).
Costs
Information on the marginal costs of placements are not available. Indeed, there are
considerable practical difficulties in ascertaining such data using sample methods.
Instead we substitute the cost function for marginal cost. Key elements of this
function are:  type of bed, client characteristics and capital costs.
The registration and regulation arrangements for residential and nursing homes
ensures that nursing homes must use a higher level of, and more costly, staff inputs.
A first cost factor therefore is the type of home, with higher unit costs expected for
nursing homes, even when all other influences are taken into consideration. This
expectation was supported by the data (see table 2). Before adjustment for regional
variations in the cost of inputs the average price of a placement in a nursing home is
£327 per week compared with £245 in a residential home (33% higher). Once
deflated using the ACA, the prices are £314 and £234 respectively.
Another cost-influencing factor is client dependency characteristics. A positive
relationship between costs and the dependency characteristics of the individual is
expected, even with the presence of the nursing bed dummy variable. A number of
difference indicators of dependence were used but the Barthel score of functional
ability was finally chosen. There was some variation in the point at which functional
abilities affected costs but Barthel scores lower than 13 or 14 were indicative of
higher costs. A Barthel cut-off dummy at a score of 9 was found to be significant.
Although the Barthel variable was significant in the final model, its t-ratio and
coefficient were considerably higher when the nursing bed dummy was dropped.
Similarly, when the Barthel variable was dropped the nursing bed variable showed a
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stronger association with price. Clearly there is a degree of collinearity between these
two variables but the findings are consistent with a significant dependency
characteristics affect both within and across care settings.
In addition to Barthel, which measures functional dependency, indicators of need for
nursing care and frequent behavioural problems (daily or more often) also were
associated with higher prices.  One indicator of social reasons for admission: housing
needs, was associated with lower costs.  These needs, which are more frequently
identified for among people admitted to residential rather than nursing care, are in
addition to individual dependency characteristics but tend to be associated with lower
physical and cognitive impairment.
A final cost factor is a proxy for capital input prices. Capital is an important input in
the residential and nursing production process and therefore we would expect capital
prices to be positively correlated with costs and therefore product prices. The proxy
variable is building society average dwelling prices (1992) (14).  This variable
proved to be a highly significant explanator (p < 0.0001) with the expected positive
sign on the OLS coefficient. The coefficient on this variable implies that a £1
increase in average dwelling prices is associated with a £0.65 increase in (ACA-
adjusted) placement prices. A full analysis of the impact of capital prices on
residential care costs also requires an investigation which taking the home as the
production unit (rather than the individual placement). This is pursued in future
work.
Product characteristics
Little information was available about the home or product received by elderly
people. Data were available, however, about whether the home was residential or
nursing, and, if dual registered, whether the individual was admitted to a nursing or
residential bed. The providing sector of the home (private or voluntary) was also
identified. These factors were included in the estimation according to their
hypothesised links with total costs. But they can also be interpreted as having a direct
influence demand at a home level, and in that way, affect prices. The dummy variable
representing nursing homes proved to be statistically significant (see table 2).
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Market distance
The local authority area serves to define the boundaries on each market. A
shortcoming of this assumption is that markets so defined in our sample vary
considerably in terms of size. We address this problem by including the size of LA
population (aged 75 and over) in the estimation.
The theory described above leads us to expect a positive relationship between price
and distance which, with constant market size, is equivalent to there being a negative
relationship between the price and the number of products in the market. There are
two particular specifications of distance we can use. The first is to begin with the
hypothesis that independent nursing homes and residential homes are highly
vertically differentiated so that in effect there are two largely separate consumer
bases for each care type. Thus horizontal (geographical) distance can be treated
separately for each of these two market subsectors. An appropriate specification
would then have the prices of residential care home placements in our sample
explained by total market area divided by the number of residential care products
(places). The nursing home prices would be specified with the total market area
divided by the number of nursing home products.
Alternatively, we can take the degree of vertical differentiation to be small so that
both types of homes are competitors for the same consumer base on a geographical
basis. Distance should then be defined as total market area divided by the sum of
products of both types of provider. Both specifications were applied to the data. The
first however was rejected by Ramsey’s reset specification test. The second
specification - with a single distance variable - was not rejected and performed well
statistically (p < 0.0001) having the expected sign. This finding offers some
preliminary support for plans expressed in the 1997 Conservative White Paper to
integrate the registration of nursing and residential care providers.
A slight variation in this latter model’s specification was tried. A variable defined as
average local population density (aged 75 and over) was included to replace the
existing population variable. This specification is arguably more precise in
controlling for different market types in our sample because it links demand directly
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with the spatial differentiation of supply. However, it transpired that the results were
almost identical with the original specification.
Further analysis regarding the strength of this association was also undertaken,
primarily to attend to the issue of cross-boundary placements and the definition of
‘true’ market boundaries. Little systematic data were available on the extent of cross-
boundary placements although what exists points to London Boroughs as being not
insignificant exporters. Using interactive dummy variables, the strength of
association between price and market distance was distinguished between London
and non-London authorities. The estimated size of the association was found to be
significantly higher for London authorities, meaning a higher change in prices in
London authorities (on average) for a unit change in market distance. This result is
consistent with a lower price elasticity of demand facing the average London
provider, which in turn implies a potential for greater surplus levels. Furthermore, the
result is consistent with a greater change in price as associated with a change in the
size of supply (holding total market size constant) which can be interpreted as an
indicator of lower competition.
However, the result is also consistent with the cross-boundary placement effect. A
significant level of placements outside London would affect ‘true’ average market
distance as pertaining to London authorities. London markets would overlap to some
extent with non-London markets. The latter markets have much higher average
distances between suppliers which in turn means that true London markets would
have higher average distances than given by LA area market distance variable (which
is the ratio of the size of the London borough over the size of supply within that
borough). If the London distance variable used in the estimation is an underestimate
of the true value, then we would expect that the use of a London interaction dummy
in the estimation to produce the results that were found. However, we cannot
determine which explanation - lower competition or higher levels of outside
placements - is appropriate, only that the data are consistent with either explanation.
A higher value of the market distance variable would act to reduce the size of the
coefficient on this variable as pertaining to London in the price estimation. The net
15
size of the association between price and a change in supply - which is our indicator
of competition - is not quite as clear cut. The coefficient on market distance is lower
but the average value of true market distance is higher. In practice the former effect
will dominate the latter meaning a smaller change in price associated with a unit
change in supply. In other words, if we accept that true market distances are larger
than the estimation value, then this means that the latter would under-estimate the
level of competition in London.
Local authority effect
An appropriate specification for our empirical model, in accepting the residual
demand hypothesis as discussed above, is to include an independent variable which is
a direct measure of local authority provision. Thus the extent of LA provision would
be inversely correlated with the demand for independent sector provision.
Alternatively, if LA providers are not so favoured then the impact of changes in the
extent of LA provision is a supply-side effect. Any impact of a change in the number
of LA providers on independent provider’s pricing would be felt via the change on
average market distance.
On average about 8 per cent of publicly supported residents were placed in local
authority provision.  In seven of the authorities the proportion was higher, ranging
between 11 and 26 per cent. The data providing support for the first specification -
the residual demand model. A dummy variable indicating that the authority placed a
higher than average proportion of people in local authority provision is associated
(significantly) with a reduction of independent sector prices of approximately £16.
However, this finding does imply a rejection of the second specification, the supply-
side competition model. Further investigation of the nature of competition between
the independent and public sectors is therefore warranted.
Contractual arrangements
Social workers were asked to identify the type of contract that had been agreed and
how the price was reached. These factors proved consistently important in the
analyses of costs of placement.
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Spot or block contracts
Spot purchases with approved providers are the most common type of placement (70
per cent of placements). Spot contract placements with other homes that were not
approved providers accounted for 20 per cent of placements, whilst the remainder
were under block contracts (10 per cent). Distinguishing between residential and
nursing care, block contracts are very rare with nursing homes - only 3 per cent of
placements compared with 17 per cent in residential homes.
A crude comparison of mean prices (table 3) indicates that admissions under spot
contracts have higher relative (mean) prices. Admissions under spot contract with
non-approved providers have yet higher relative (mean) prices, while admissions
under spot contracts with approved providers have lower relative prices.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Various specification of contract type were tried in the estimation. The final model
reported in table 2 distinguishes between spot contract with approved and non-
approved providers, and also uses interactive dummy variables which differentiate
the impact of the spot contract variables between nursing and residential care home
types. In all cases these variables were statistically significant.
The chosen specification with its interactive dummy variables precludes
straightforward interpretation of the impact of each contract type from the estimation
coefficients reported. The net effect of spot contracts with non-approved providers is
a linear combination of the coefficients relating to the association between this
contract variable as it applies to both the residential and nursing homes in the sample.
In this way it was calculated that the use of spot contracts with non-approved
providers is associated with a price increase of £1.59. In contrast, use of spot
contracts with approved providers is consistent with a £0.54 reduction in price. These
latter two results are consistent with the crude comparisons reported in table 5. The
(unweighted) combination of these two types (i.e. all spot contracts) has an
association with price of positive £1.05. The weighted combination (by sample mean)
has a coefficient value of -£0.01.
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Other things being equal we would expect spot contracts arrangements to have higher
prices compared with block contracts because, with the former, risk regarding the
number of admissions is with the provider (see the theoretical section above). The
allocation of risk changes when account is made of approved and non-approved
status for providers. Approved status should entail considerably less risk for
providers compared with non-approved status. Thus in the former case a price
discount is likely to reflect the greater certainty of placements being made. This
hypothesis is supported by the data. Nonetheless, risk is still greater with spot
contracts of either type than with block arrangements.
Our a priori expectation of higher spot contract prices is modified if differences in
competitiveness are taken into account. Block contracts are likely to increase
provider market power especially if the number of (guaranteed) places bought is large
(as it often is so that the risk advantages may be had). When a market is very
competitive anyway this shift in market power is unlikely to have any particular
significance. However, if a market is not very competitive then the use of block
contracts may have important ramifications for price negotiation. Indeed, in this
situation block contracted providers may be able to push up prices relative to spot
contract providers. The data were interrogated using an interactive variable. It was
found that there was a statistically significant relationship suggesting prices are
higher when spot contracts are used where competition is high. By contrast, spot
contract prices are lower compared to block contract prices in relatively low
competition areas.
Advanced or contingent pricing
The process of negotiating price is also hypothesised to have an impact on placement
prices. Before considering other influences the average cost of an individually
negotiated contract for a specific client was £296 compared with £269 for other
arrangements. In the regression analysis, which allows a range of other factors have
been taken into consideration, placements with individually negotiated contracts were
associated with price being some £20 (approximately) higher. This relationship was
highly significant (p < 0.0001). The data provide support for our hypothesis that
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providers have an incentive to exaggerate the costs of care in order to secure a higher
price (15). It is important to stress that the regression allows account to be made of
client circumstances and dependency and therefore seeks to control for real
differences in costs. Thus we can discount the hypothesis that these contracts are
used when clients have special circumstances such as particularly difficult behaviour,
severe dementia or nursing requirements that would raise the costs of care. If
anything, people who had an individually negotiated price tended to be less
dependent according to our measures. A caveat is that some cost-raising client
characteristics may not be sufficiently specified in the regression (despite the
diagnostics rejecting mis-specification problems) and therefore we cannot completely
reject the special circumstances hypothesis.
In addition to this hypothesis regarding information and incentives, we need also to
consider bargaining and co-ordination. An individually negotiated placement is likely
to occur when a purchaser wants the contract to be tailored specifically to the
individual client’s needs (and expression of choice).  This form of commissioning
must by definition have a client specific focus and therefore is likely to be undertaken
with decentralised purchasers (e.g. care managers with purchasing resources); it
would be very difficult and inefficient to operate this type of commissioning
strategically. However, these decentralised purchasers will have far less market
power than strategic purchasers. Thus, comparatively the balance of bargaining
power is with the provider. Consequently we would expect the negotiated price of
such a placement to be relatively high. In contrast when the authority is negotiating
for a price for future residents the balance of power is in favour of the local authority
if the home wants to have a future supply of publicly funded residents. Moreover,
strategic purchasing is far more feasible. The data do not reject this hypothesis.
It might be expected that those authorities that set a price tariff authority wide would
be most effective in keeping costs down but in practice when this was included in the
equation (as it was in some models) it actually served to raise the expected cost of
placement.  What did seem to keep costs down was where authorities agreed a price
in advance with individual homes.  In our analysis, a price of placement reduction of
about £4 was associated with a fixed price policy at the home level.  It is possible that
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this reflects authorities taking advantage of specific offers from homes where
competition is high and homes are under-occupied.  Local authorities negotiating
with all homes individually would have important implications for their transaction
costs.
Discussion
The primary objective of this paper is an understanding of what factors lie behind the
cost, to the purchaser, of residential and nursing care for elderly people. A priori
theorising and previous analysis point to the elements that make-up production cost
as being closely associated with prices. Strong evidence of such a relationship was
found, particularly in regard to client dependency and the type of care they receive as
defined by registration legislation. Drawing further on the relevant theory, two other
sets of influences on price were identified and subsequently investigated. These
factors are competition and contract type.
A spatial differentiation model was used as the basis for considering the empirical
relevance of competition. The competition variable was simply defined as average
market (LA) size divided the LA number of places. This proxy measure proved to be
highly significant (p < 0.00001). The implied strength of association with this
measure and prices, as estimated, can be put into context using the notion of an
‘average’ authority which has the sample’s mean size and number of providers.
Interpreting our results for such an authority, a 1 per cent change in the number of
places (both residential and nursing) is associated with a minus 12p change in the
price of placement (all other things being equal).
Clearly, within the constraints of this type of empirical analysis (which were
described above), the findings suggest a relatively low-key role for local authority
competition policy, such as efforts to reduce barriers to market entry and exit. Other
work has used a price elasticities approach in making inferences about contestability
(16). This approach avoids the problems of defining market boundaries. The results
were broadly consistent with the above estimates, with mark-up rates (surpluses)
running at no more than 10 per cent of the weekly charge.
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Perhaps a more important focus for policy is in establishing the priority given to in-
house provision over and above the independent sector. Our results certainly point to
the existence of a negative relationship between the size of the in-house sector and
the price of independent sector supply. Moreover, there is some empirical support for
the view that, within our sample, the size of in-house provision acts to reduce total
demand for independent sector rather than being solely a supply-side competition
effect.
Local authorities have little or no influence over many factors that influence costs.
One area where they do clearly have an influence is on the contractual arrangements
they enter into with homes and their policies when agreeing prices. According to our
sample, contract choice has an important relationship with prices. Statistically
significant associations with price we found with respect to spot or block contracts;
whether contracts were written with approved or non-approved providers; and
whether prices were set in advance, at the home or local authority level, or whether
they were set according to specific clients.
The choice of contract and reimbursement mechanism therefore appears to have
implications for the price of particular residential care placements. But what does this
mean for the welfare of stakeholders? The choice of contract type is argued to affect:
the distribution of risk between purchaser and provider; the degree of targeting of
services that is accommodated; and, incentives for acquisition of low cost production
techniques and also misrepresentation of information. The former feature, the
allocation of risk, would be expected to show up in the agreed price. Providers may
accept lower prices if their risk burden is reduced and this insurance adjustment is
quite consistent with mutual benefits. Adopting contracts that facilitate this insurance
function is clearly desirable and should lead to lower prices (taking other factors as
constant).
The choice of contract type is also a de facto choice of incentives which has
ramifications for appropriate use and reporting of information. The argument is made
that non-contingent fixed price contracts (e.g. block contracts) tend to promote
inappropriate selection of clients (cream-skimming) while contingent contracts (spot
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contracts) may be associated with exaggeration of the costs of providing specific
client care (15).
A problem is that the risk function and information properties associated with
different contract types may be inconsistent in terms of stakeholder outcomes. Lower
prices need not be indicative of fewer informational problems; indeed the converse is
likely to be the case. For example, block contracts may reduce provider risk and
hence the contract price, but may also lead to cream-skimming and shirking on
quality. In assessing therefore the choice of contract types for policy purposes, even
at a very modest level, our judgement should go beyond looking simply at which type
of contract tends to generate lowest prices. In addition, any assessment of these
contract choice consequences (on stakeholders welfare) must take account of the
costs of that choice. Contracts and reimbursement mechanisms are methods of
governance of transactions. Governance can improve outcomes for given resourcing
levels but in doing so diverts resources away from directly productive uses. The
opportunity cost of governance is therefore a loss of (potentially) beneficial outcomes
associated with the diversion of resources away from production. Clearly this
siphoning of resources is acceptable only if the benefits created by more intensive
governance exceed these opportunity costs.
Scope remains for a more in-depth investigation of the relationship between price
and contract type. Progress can then be made in making a fuller assessment of
optimal choices of contract type. Further work to unpack market-level effects on
prices such as the impact of contestability and how it is linked with demand for a
particular provider’s product would also be useful. Such as approach would also side-
step the problems of defining market boundaries. Indeed, the most useful information
for policy making is in regard to short-term and long-term market contestability.
The findings of this work can be seen as a contribution to the policy debate regarding
the nature and scope of commissioning arrangements that are available to local
authorities. Some important associations between competition, contract choices and
prices were investigated and discussed. Whilst not explicitly drawn out, the analysis
suggests that modest but not insignificant efficiency savings could be released as a
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result of improved policy choices regarding commissioning arrangements. At the
very least, the findings provides some justification for further work to more precisely
assess the potential for reductions in efficiency shortfalls.
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